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JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY DECISIONS
SUPREME COURT CONSTRUCTION OF MAIL RATE
SUBSIDIES TO AIRLINES

T

HE Supreme Court of the United States has recently handed down a
significant interpretation of the mail rate and subsidy provisions of the
Civil Aeronautics Act.1 This decision severely restricts the power of the
Civil Aeronautics Board to exercise discretion in the granting of air mail
subsidies. In Delta Air Lines v. Summerfield,2 and Western Air Lines v.
C.A.B., 8 the Board attempted, through its power to grant compensation for
the carriage of mail, to base subsidy awards on the economic and public
policy which it assumed should be adopted toward the air industry. In computing the subsidy award the Board refused to offset certain past profits in
the belief that not requiring their use as an offset would insure competitive
equality among the airlines and would encourage mergers and route sales.
All of the commercial airlines, until recently, have been dependent from
infancy upon government subsidies for their existence. 4 Monetary subsidies
are granted under the guise of payment for the transportation of mail;
awarded by the Board, and at the time this case was before the Board, 5 paid
from the budget of the Post Office Department. The Postmaster General was
of the view that the Board's interpretation was not well founded and, since
forced to pay the subsidy, appealed. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia held that the Board had overstepped its power under
the Act, 6 and the Supreme Court affirmed.
The Act authorizes the Board to fix rates
for the transportation of mail
7"
in accordance with the following standard
Section 406(b) "In fixing and determining fair and reasonable
rates of compensation under this section, the Board . . . may fix

different rates for different air carriers or classes of air carriers,
and different classes of service .. . [T]he [Board] . . . shall take
into consideration among other factors,... the need of each such air

carrier for compensation for the transportation of mail sufficient to
insure the performance of such service, and together with all other
revenue of the air carrier, to enable such air carrier under honest,
economical, and efficient management, to maintain and continue the
development of air transportation to the extent and of the character
1 52 STAT. 977 (1938),
2 347 U.S. 74 (1954).

as amended, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 401, et seq. (1948).

8 347

U.S. 67 (1954).
4Subsidies are given in two forms: 1) direct monetary aid in accordance

with the Act; and 2) indirect services supplied by the Government; such as
Government airports, airway facilities, weather bureaus, and other navigational
aids. In the last few years the dcmestic divisions of many of the larger carriers
have been removed from the monetary need or subsidy category and put on a
service rate, which the Board feels is lacking in direct subsidy, and is solely com-

pensation for the carriage of mail.
5 For services after October 1, 1953, subsidy payments will be given directly
by the Board and only compensation for the carriage of mail will be given by the
Post Office Department. Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1953, 18 FED. REG. 4543
(1953).
6207 F. 2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
7 Section 406(a) "The [Board] .. .is empowered and directed ... to fix and

determine from time to time, after notice and hearing, the fair and reasonable
rates of compensation for the transportation of mail by air craft, ... " 52 STAT.
977 (1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 486 (a) (1948).
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and quality required for the commerce of the United States, the
Postal Service, and the national defense." 8

In 1948 the Board set a final subsidy rate for the domestic lines, i.e.
routes within the United States, of Chicago & Southern Air Lines. 9 This
action gave the airline its expenses for the transportation of mail, and an
additional amount intended to cover all other expenses; bringing them a total
percent return on their investment of 7.4.10 During the next three years
Chicago & Southern was more profitable than anticipated and accrued $654,000 in excess of the 7.4 percent return, resulting in a 12.5 percent return.
In 1951 the Board set the mail and subsidy rates for Chicago & Southern's Latin American routes. In fixing the compensation for the past operations of the foreign division the Board refused to offset the additional
$654,000 which the domestic division had earned.'1 In so doing the Board
interpreted the statute as giving them the discretion to consider each division of Chicago & Southern as a separate entity for subsidy purposes. In
addition they felt that the "need" of the airline, which is that amount over
all other revenue which will satisfy the statutory objectives, was only one
factor to be considered. The Postmaster General appealed from this determination on the ground that the Board must find the need of the carrier as
a whole, and award the subsidy in strict accordance with that need. The
Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court accepted the Postmaster
General's contention.
The problems presented are: 1) did the Court correctly interpret the
statute; 2) is this interpretation in accord with public economic policy; and
3) if not, what should be done to remedy the situation. Viewing the problem
from a strict legalistic approach the Court's decision would seem to be
correct. However the economic policy which the Board is attempting to
foster is in accord with the best interests of the airlines themselves and with
the public's desire for an efficient and aggressive air industry. The following
discussion attempts to point out the basis of the Court's decision and the
policy arguments which make this decision somewhat undesirable.
Legal Issues Involved
Interpretation of the Civil Aeronautics Act involves two questions: 1)
must the carrier's operations be considered as a whole; and 2) if so, does
the Board have the power to consider public economic policy, as well as need,
of the carrier, in setting the subsidy rate? In determining the first question
the Board and the airlines argue that the statutory authority to " . . . fix
different rates for different air carriers or classes of air carriers, and the
different classes of service, ' 12 means that in computing subsidy awards the
Board may treat the domestic and foreign divisions as entirely separate.
The basis for this conclusion stems from arguing that "different classes of
service" contemplates different divisions within an airline. However, to
interpret an isolated provision, reference should be made to the remainder
of the statute and to prior interpretations. The Act later directs the Board
8 52 STAT. 977 (1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 486(b) (1948).

9 Since that time, Chicago & Southern has merged with Delta Air Lines.

Delta-Chicago and Southern Merger Case. CCH

AVIATION LAW REP.

21,557. Delta was the survivor of the merger and was substituted as the intervenor subsequent to the decision of the Court of Appeals.
1e Chicago and Southern A.L. Mail Rates, 9 C.A.B. 786 (1948).
11 Subsidies are awarded for both past and future operation. If the Board
had determined to offset the $654,000 it would have reduced payment for past mail
transportation by this amount and would not have reduced future subsidy rates.
12 52 STAT. 977 (1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 486(b) (1948).
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13
and defines air carrier in
to consider "the need of each such air carrier"
14
terms of a single undivided corporation.
In addition, the Board itself has, in the past, determined that for the
of the whole airline,
purpose of fixing rates the need of the carrier is that
15
and not the need of a single geographical division. Since both the Act and
prior Board determinations have considered the carrier as a single nondivisable unit for determining the need of the carrier, what is the effect to
that the Board may fix different rates for different
be given the provision
16
classes of service?
The Board itself has supplied the answer in its practices, for as a procedural expedient it often determines domestic and foreign rates at different
a greater
times, and in setting future returns gives the foreign divisions
17
rate of return on investment than it gives to the domestic. But in fixing
rates separately the Board is still bound by the requirement that the need
is that of the whole carrier, and not the need of one of its divisions. Since
this provision does have a definite meaning, other than that ascribed by the
Board in this case, and since both the Act and the Board have considered
the carrier a non-divisible unit, the Court's interpretation seems to be correct. However, Judge Prettyman in the Court of Appeals was so impressed
with certain policy considerations that he dissented on the ground that the
8
divisions may be considered separate for rate setting purposes.1
Secondly the Board argues that even though they must consider the
carrier as a whole, they may balance the need of the carrier with public
consideration" the need
policy.19 The Act authorizes the Board to "take into
20
of the carrier together with all other revenue. By the term "all other
revenue," it seems certain that Congress intended that the Board should
consider all of the carrier's revenue and not just some. The need of the
carrier
carrier is that amount over all other revenue which will enable the
'2
to "maintain and continue the development of air transportation." ' Having
ascertained the need of the airline, the remaining question is whether the
Board must award the subsidy in strict accordance with that need or,
whether for policy reasons, it may allow the carrier to retain amounts in
excess of their need. From a literal construction of the statute it would
seem that Congress endorsed the second choice since the statutory mandate
requires only that the Board take need into "consideration." However, to
so hold, would leave the Board with no measurable standard in determining

1 Ibid.
1452 STAT. 977 (1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 401 (2), (13) (1948).
15 Chicago and Southern A.L. Mail Rates - Route Nos. 8 & 53, 3 C.A.B. 161,

190 (1941); Pan. Am. Airways Inc., Alaska Mail Rates, 6 C.A.B. 61, 67 (1944) ;
Pan. Am. Airways, Inc., Mail Rates, 8 C.A.B. 876, 882 (1947) ; Western A.L. Mail
Rates, 4 C.A.B. 441, 444 (1943).
16 It is frequently said that in statutory construction effect must be given to
every provision. 1 KENT'S COMM. 462 (13th ed. 1884) ; 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION Sec. 4705 (3rd ed. Horack 1943).
17 As a rule the Board gives a seven percent return on investment on both
foreign and domestic divisions when setting a past rate, while in setting future
rates an eight percent rate of return is usually allowed for domestic divisions and
a ten percent rate for foreign divisions. This added return for future foreign

divisions is apparently due to the greater uncertainty surrounding foreign operation.

Is 207 F. 2d 207, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
19 Brief for the Civil Aeronautics Board, pp. 39-44, Delta Air Lines v. Summerfield, 347 U.S. 74 (1954).
20 52 STAT. 977 (1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 486(b) (1948).
21 Ibid. It is important that the Board did not determine that the carrier
"needed" the extra $654,000, but only that as a matter of policy the excess should
not be taken into account in determining the subsidy. If the Board had determined

that Chicago & Southern did need the domestic excess, the case would be entirely
different and much more favorable to the Board.
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the subsidy. It seems improbable that this could have been the intent of Congress in drafting the statute in light of the carefully worked out need
formula. If such discretion was intended it would have been a simple matter
to have explicitly given the Board the desired discretion, The better reasoning would seem to be that unless Congress has expressly given an agency
wide discretion in the granting of public funds such discretion should not
be read into the statute. Following this approach need appears to be an
absolute standard and the subsidy grant must be based solely on the determined need. From the foregoing discussion it appears that the Court properly interpreted the statute before it.
In accordance with recognized judicial policy it may be contended that
the Board's interpretation of the Act is reasonable, and thus should be
allowed to stand. 22 Assuming that the Board's construction is reasonable
and founded in the record, it still does not follow that the judiciary is precluded from review. A limited scope of review is, as a rule, utilized only
where the decision is a technical one particularly suited to the expertness
of the Board members, and where the effect of the interpretation is limited
in its scope and does not substantially affect the law in the area. 23 However,
as is here involved, when an agency interprets an Act of Congress, and that
interpretation will greatly affect the power of the agency itself, the Courts
should review that decision in its entirety.
Economic Problems
The foregoing discussion has treated only the problem of statutory
construction with no consideration of the economic and policy factors underlying the Board's interpretation. It is now necessary to examine these
factors upon which the Board bases its rationale in order to see if the
Court's decision is desirable.
The first consideration is that under the Court's decision there is a lack
of finality once the subsidy rates are set, in spite of the fact that the Board
attempted to fix final rates when it set the domestic rates for Chicago &
Southern. 24 Under the Court's decision the domestic subsidy for carriers
operating both foreign and domestic routes will not become final until the
foreign rates are set.25 In competitive economy it is desirable that when
future rates are set they be final, and not subject to later change, in order
to encourage management and operation economy. Unless rates are final,
when set, a carrier operating both domestic and foreign lines would have
a lack of interest in economy, since economical operation would result in a
22 American Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 178 F. 2d 903, 908 (7th Cir.
1949). The Circuit Court said "Our function is limited; we may only inquire as
to whether the Board's interpretation of the statute [the Act] has warrant in
the record, and a reasonable basis in law."
23 Davis, Scope of Review of Federal Administrative Action, 50 COL. L. REV.
559 (1950).
24 Chicago and Southern. A.L. Mail Rates, 9 C.A.B. 786, 812 (1948). The
Board in fixing what it considered to be final rates said "Similarly, any economies
which the carrier's management succeeds in accomplishing through effective cost
controls or improved operating procedures and techniques which serve to avert
or mitigate anticipated increases in prices and to decrease operating costs below
the unit cost of 116.6 cents per revenue plane mile estimated herein will inure to
the carrier in the form of higher earnings."
25 Rather than being final when fixed, the excess profit earned through added
efficiency under the domestic rates would be used to offset losses on foreign lines,
and by the same token if the carrier were to lose money on its domestic routes
such losses should be made up at the time the foreign rate is set. It seems impossible that such procedure would do anything other than retard management and
operational economy.
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gain only to the public treasury and not to themselves. 2s This follows from
the realization that a carrier will lose money on its foreign lines and all
profit that it accrues through economies on its domestic lines will be used
to offset the foreign loss. Since rate finality enhances carrier' economy, such
rate fixing is desirable since present economy will result in lower future
subsidies.
The second contention in the Board's public policy argument is that
the instant decision will result in inequitable competition. The overseas
lines of the air carriers today are rapidly losing money whereas the domestic
lines are for the major part self-sufficient and no longer in need of subsidy. 27
With the Board's policy of rate finality undisturbed, except as to the four 28
lines engaged in both domestic and foreign operations, it is clear that
these four are at a definite disadvantage. Under the rate finality plan the
six other major trunk carriers would be allowed to retain whatever excess
they might accrue through economy while the four operating both domestic
and foreign lines will have their domestic excess profits offset against their
certain foreign losses. Thus, while American Air Lines might have a fifteen
percent return on investment due to economy measures after their rate was
set, Delta Air Lines could not possibly have a greater return than that
minimum authorized by the Board. Therefore it is clear that those carriers
operating in both the domestic and foreign fields will be at a competitive
disadvantage, since the carriers with only domestic lines may use their
excess profits for better accommodations, advertising, or perhaps to reduce
fares; while those operating in both fields would be forced to use their
domestic excess to offset foreign losses. That the airlines should be allowed
to expand through competition has been recognized by the Supreme Court 29
and by Congress in the Civil Aeronautics Act.30 The competitive disadvantage under which these lines operate would have the possible effect of
allowing the domestic carriers to grow larger and stronger while the foreigndomestic carriers would be forced to rely more and more on government
subsidies.
A third basis of the Board's rationale is that the Court's decision will
retard rather than promote interest and development in the field of international air traffic. The nation's foreign policy requires full and active
participation by the air carriers in international air transportation. While
it may be difficult for an airline to drop an existing foreign route, 1 a car26 This objection is partially compensated for by the fact that the Board is
authorized to fix compensation sufficient to enable the carrier under economical
management to meet the statutory objectives. If the Board were of the opinion
that the carrier was not economical it could reduce its need rate so that only
economical management would give the proper return on investment. As a practical matter however, it would be difficult for the Board to say that a certain
carrier was not economical without definite facts to back it up and needless to say
these facts would be difficult to ascertain.
27 Civil Aeronautics Board, Report, Administrative Separation of Subsidy
from Total Mail Payments to United States Air Carriers, September 1953 Revision, App. 4 and 9 (1953). For the current fiscal year ending June 30, 1954, the
Board estimates that for those carriers having both domestic and foreign operations, only 4.7 percent of the total $10,474,000 which will be paid for domestic
operation will represent subsidy, while 69 percent of the total $18,356,000 to be
paid for foreign operation will constitute subsidy.
28 Trans World Air Lines, Braniff Air Lines, Northwest Air Lines, and Delta
Air Lines.
29 T.W.A. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 336 U.S. 601,606 (1949).
30 52 STAT. 977 (1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 402 (d) (1948).
51 The Act provides "[k] No air carrier shall abandon any route, or part
thereof for which a certificate has been issued ... unless the [Board] shall find
such abandonment to be in the public interest . . . " 52 STAT. 977 (1938), as
amended, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 481(k) (1948).
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rier must be "willing" to enter the international field or to extend its
32
existing loreign routes before the Board may authorize it to do so. Since
a carrier in the international field is precluded Irom keeping excess domestic
profits, it is a reasonable assumption that airlines will not be willing to enter
the foreign field. The validity of this statement was recently borne out when
the Board suggested a merger between Western Air Lines, a non-subsidized
domestic carrier, and Alaska Air Lines, a carrier operating between Alaska
and the United States. Although the merger would have resulted in more
efficient and economical operation, Western refused to merge, since by the
Court's decision it would have had to offset its domestic profits on the
Alaskan losses. 33
It has been suggested that airlines will become entirely self-sufficient
3 4
only if they exercise a policy of merger and route transfer. Through the
merger of several of the smaller lines to form a few large lines, and the
transfer between airlines of unprofitable and inefficient routes to carriers
that could better operate them, the Government's subsidy bill would be
greatly reduced and efficiency would be increased.3 5 The possibility of mergers between carriers operating foreign lines with those operating only
domestic lines has been reviewed above. A merger between two wholly
domestic carriers, or the transfer of a domestic route certificate between
carriers could work no monetary hardship, as would a foreign-domestic
merger, but the carriers have been hesitant to complete domestic mergers
or sell route certificates. Working on the theory that they could not force
such mergers or sales, the Board has proceeded under the view that by
profit motives they could encourage such action. Such was the position of
the Board in the companion case, Western Air Lines v. C.A.B., 8 where, in
fixing Western's mail compensation, the Board refused to include in "all
other revenue" certain profit accruing to Western Air Lines on a route sale
to United Air Lines.8 7 Consistent with the principal case, the Court held
that "all other revenue," which is to be offset against the need of the
carrier, must include all of the carrier's revenue regardless of its source,
and in effect held that the Board could not foster such sales through the
profit motive. By the proper application of this power the Board could
significantly strengthen and stabilize the air industry, however regulation
to this extent by the Board might weaken the independent and competitive
nature of the airlines. Since the carriers are becoming stronger and more
self-sufficient year by year it would perhaps be best to rely on private
initiative to settle problems of merger and route transfer, without monetary
encouragement from the Board.
The Court did not deny the weight of the Board's arguments on economic
policy in the Delta case3 8 but held only that such action was not authorized
by the Civil Aeronautics Act. The Board's position in that case was not one
8252 STAT. 977 (1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 481(d) (1) (1948).
33 Brief for the Civil Aeronautics Board, p. 28, Delta Air Lines v. Summerfield, 347 U.S. 74 (1954).
84 Koontz, Economic and ManagerialFactors Affecting Subsidy, 18 JRL. OF
AIR LAW & COM. 127 (1951); Comment, 60 YALE L. J. 1196 (1951).
35 The subsidy for the domestic services of Chicago & Southern is estimated
to have been reduced $539,000 a year as a result of their merger with Delta.
86 347 U.S. 67 (1954).
37 Western operasting a route between Los Angeles and Denver sold that route
to United Air Lines for $3,750,000. Of this $648,102 was computed as profit on
the sale of tangibles and $447,000 as profit on the sale of intangibles, presumably
good will and the like. The Board refused to include in its computation of "all
other Revenue" the intangible profit feeling that the sale was in the public interest
and that the retention by Western of the intangible profit would proride an incentive for other carriers to make such sales.
88 Delta Air Lines v. Summerfield, 347 U.S. 74, 79-80 (1954).

